An Existential Ethical Imperative by Lambert, Kent A.
43 
An Existential Ethical Imperative 




Morality is not simply the ability to judge something as being "good" 
or "bad". Indeed, far more fundamental for moral activity is the ability to 
recognize responsibility for one's choices. Whether that responsibility is there 
implicitly or not, morality requires that it be recognizable to the individual (else 
morality is meaningless). In other words, the individual must be able to 
apprehend and authentically affirm some value that provides him or her with a 
recognition of his or her responsibility in making choices. It is the intent of this 
paper to illustrate that this fundamental moral activity is possible in Sartre's 
ontological structure through the existence of an existential imperative, that is, a 
truth revealed by our existence which necessitates us to choose some value if we 
are to authentically understand and relate to our own humanity. 
An appropriate place to begin any discussion of human morality is with 
the issue of what it means to be human. For Sartre, to be a human being, i.e., to 
be a for-itself - is to be an ambiguity, a Heraclitean tension between opposites. 
Sartre suggests that we can conceive of this ambiguity, Or what he refers to as an 
internal negation, by nothing that the human individual "is not what it is, and is 
what it is not." To see what Sartre is trying to say here, consider the same 
phrase in terms of temporality: "as present, it is not what it is (past) and is what 
it is not (future)." The individual is no longer what it was (it was its past) and it 
is what is shall be - the individual is its future possibilities. The past is always 
possible only for a specific present. It has meaning only in relation to the 
prescnt. The past exists as a substance, part of the individual's situation or 
circumstance in the concrete world. We can say, then, that one is not one's past 
exactly to the extent that one was one's past. 
The present derives its significance not only from the past but also from 
the future. It is human rcality that tcmporalizes itself, and to the extent that it 
does so, it always does so from this moment, not some past or future moment. 
The present exists strictly as a sort of ground zero. Hence, we may say of the 
present that it is a sort of nullity, a goometrical point in time with no diameter or 
space, connecting what has been temporalized as the past with what has yet to 
become - I.e. the individual's possibilities or future. Future, to the extent that it 
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defines the present, acts as a lack, denying that in the next moment I necessarily 
will be what my past suggests I wiIl be. 
The human being, however, is not just a consciousness, is not an 
abstract or spiritual conscious entity, but rather, is an embodied for-itself. I can 
temporalize myself, i.e. I can make decisions, exactly and only to the extent that 
I exist in a concrete situation. Therefore, both physical and mental factors are 
required to generate a choice - you cannot choose when there is nothing to 
choose from, whether or not there is something to choose with. 
Now we are in a position to come to terms with Sartre's understanding 
of freedom. As human beings, we certainly do have an acute notion of 
temporality, and further, we also have an awareness of existing in a situation. 
Noting this, Sartre suggests that human beings are unable not to temporalize, 
and temporalization, in tum, requires that human beings act as choice makers 
within a specific situation. If I am a termporalizer, then my future and past must 
be distinguishable, which in tum implies that my future not be determined by 
my past - i.e. that I am free to make decisions that are wholly independent of my 
past decisions. Further, however, it means that I must choose constantly if I am 
to exist as a conscious for-itself. As long as I am alive, because I exist in a 
situation and have an awareness of it and myself, I must choose myself with 
reference to the situation. The human being, to the extent that it temporalizes, is 
apprehensible only as a choice-in-the-making. It is this notion that Sartre 
equates with human freedom. Freedom is choosing. The success of a choice is 
unimportant. It is important only that as a human being we must choose, or else 
we cannot exist as anything but meaningless temporalized (versus 
temporalizing) stuff, i.e. as objects (as beings that are what they are, wherein our 
past, present, and future are all perfectly synonymous and hence meaningless). 
We may fail, we may be wrong, we may be constrained to the basest of choices, 
but we must nonetheless choose or else cease to exist as human beings, as 
conscious beings. 
Another way to understand the freedom of the human being is to say 
that as a for-itselfj the human individual's existence must precede its essence. If 
I, as a human being, am a temporalizer, tllen it must be me who introduces past 
and future, it must be me that makes legitimate choices - Le. there can be no 
"God''. etc., which has at some original moment determined me as what I am, 
creating a synonymity between my past, present and future. My identity, as it 
can be expressed, is identifiable only with my past and will therefore never fully 
45 
capture the significance of my present and future. Instead of viewing myself 
(and being viewed) as a fixed identity, the individual is forced to acknowledge 
that he or she is exactly what he or she does. 
I must (to make the above point differently) determine myself. It is 
true that this means I am from the outset undetermined, but my indeterminacy 
does not relieve me from action. Indeed, as we have just seen, it condemns me 
to action. However, it is not enough for me to simply act, to naively engage my 
indeterminism with the world. If I act wi thout recognizing in the world my own 
essential, farthest reaching possibilities and goals, ifI allow each act's 
immediate directionality or inertia to pull me along without an awareness of its 
meaning relative to my own essential possibilities and values, I am effectively 
denying my own freedom. Any and every situation, and hence any and every 
meaning I envision within the world, exists only in reference to all the 
possibilities present to me. I must decide, and by deciding (whether I actively or 
willingly choose to recognize it or not) I posit meaning and values, and this 
valuation is based upon my freedom. Indeed, I am the only means for realizing 
the meaning of the world and of my essence, and this, finally, can be meaningful 
only to he extent that it derives fTom my freedom. We are "free", yet we must 
nonetheless make ourselves free, we must recognize and accept our freedom as 
the creator of all existential possibility, or it will appear to us simply as another 
determined part of our situation. 
In other words, if I am not 1.0 deny what is necessarily the case, I must 
recognize my freedom as the source of all values, and, in so doing, I must will 
my freedom. I must, in order to avoid denying what is constantly revealed to me 
as true, refuse to polarize my existence with any end beyond itself. My 
existence as a choice-in-the-making must grru.-p itself as its own value and end or 
I am consciously deceiving myself. 
How is it that I am able to deceive myself consciously? To grasp the 
point one is probably better off trying to explain the validity of its antithesis ­
can I unconsciously deceive myselr? Any effort to nee my reality as the sole 
author of meaning in the world only serves to show that I am aware of it - I must 
think of my freedom constantly in order to not think about it. I may deny my 
own freedom, but as I do so, I do so with an awareness of it since I must choose 
to do so, that is, I must exercise my freedom to do so by making that decision. I 
can nee my freedom, but I cannot then ignore my flight! 
If I recognize my freedom as human existence, that is as something that 
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must constantly be accomplished (constantly because I am set at a distance from 
my values by my freedom to affmn or reject the choices and projects of my 
past), I am living an authentic life. The inauthentic life can then be thought of as 
a type of bad faith wherein the individual denies his or her ambiguity as a for­
itself, which, as noted earlier, consists in the fact that one is not what one is and 
is what one is not. Bad faith is manifested by playing these two truths of human 
existence off one another, so that I may hide from my responsibilities by 
defining myself in terms of my past, or similarly, may deny the significance of 
my past by denying that I am anything but a disembodied free "choice-in-the­
making". Hence, the rapist, ashamed of his identity as such, may deny that his 
past actions affect his present being by identifying himself exclusively as a 
transcending of his past; however, in order to grasp this transcendence so as to 
deny his past, he must understand it as a substantive identity of "not being a 
rapist". To be authentic is to coordinate the two aspects of my ambiguous 
identity, not just embracing one by denying the significance of the other. The 
rapist is confronted by the actions of his past as a substantive aspect of his 
situation and how he chooses in that situation determines the meaning of his 
present and future acts. 
We are without appeal to anything but ourselves when we make a 
decision, and hence we arc completely responsible for our decisions. To act 
authentically is merely to act in accordance with the nature which ontology 
defines. In this case, it means not to surrender ourselves to some role, giving 
objective significance to the meanings which only we, in our frecdom, and 
hence with complete responsibility, can create. Nonetheless, it also means not 
imagining that I can exist beyond or without the situation, nor does it entail 
denying the significance of my past. I do have a past that exists as a substantive 
part of my situation and which must be acknowledged. However, 
acknow ledgement of my past in no way eliminates my nced to choose - i.e. have 
a future. Hence, any time that I attempt to be for myself what I am, I am in bad 
faith - that is, I am living inauthentically, for such an effort denies my reality as 
tcmporalizcr, denies my existence as a choice-in-the-making. 
The challenge for the authentic individual is to become conscious of 
one's self as the author of meaning and values. It means disallowing and 
challenging any significance ascribed to values on their own. It means 
recognizing and accepting one's responsibility. And it means doing all this 
without positing such an awareness as an ideal, as possessing value for itself. 
47 
While this seems almost contradictory, there is a solution: by positing the 
ontological truth of our condition as a value, recognizing therein its authorship 
of all other values, we can accomplish authenticity. Here I no longer naively 
play out a role, but neither do I objectively transcend all roles by identifying 
myself as beyond mere roles. I do not objectify values and yet I posit my 
ontological identity as the source of values. However, as we have noted, we 
exist in situation, as an embodied consciousness, and must act out our 
authenticity in a concrete fashion. 
The for-itself must act. Action, as distinct from mere movement, etc., 
requires one to have a goal or project. That is to say, action presupposes 
freedom - I must express an intentionality towards the future. I am free, and 
hence I must create myself. My freedom exists at the heart of my being as a 
void, as a nothingness which demands that I make myself, not simply will 
myself. I must act on my freedom, not merely contemplate it. There are no 
motives or passions innate within me, so that only through making a choice, 
only through action (which presupposes, in turn, a situation) are my intentions 
established; indeed, only here are they ever revealed to me. Freedom exists only 
as a negative reality (as a undetermined existence). To become a positive 
reality, freedom must be realized by us through action. We are free, but we 
must nevertheless free ourselves our voluntary reflexiveness must be brought 
to an active realization of our spontaneous constitution as thoughl/choosing. 
As has been already noted, we are an embodied consciousness. We 
exist physically in situations. Further, our situation includes the presence of 
others. We do not somehow constitute olhers, we merely encounter them. Yet 
in encountering another, I am not encountering a mere object. The other is for­
itself, or consciousness, and this is a fact which I recognize when I feel ashamed 
or self-conscious around another. What I am for the other, what field of 
possibilities the other ascribes to me, is beyond my control. The other makes me 
become, suddenly, an object, but not for myself - only for the other. This view 
of myself as existing for the other (as what I was) is a result of my own 
existence as an ambiguity - I do have a being for others, and it is no more 
revealing of my subjectivity than the others being for me is in my encounter 
with her. My being for others is my objective side, revealed to me by the 
presence of others, real or imagined, when I am suddenly aware of myself as 
appearing to others as an inert, passive object-in-the-world which is exactly 
what it is. To be authentic, I must recognize that my actions are not effected 
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only by me. The objective identity I take before the other is as much a part of 
who or what I am as the being I have for myself. If I try to utilize one or the 
other in order to escape my responsibility as author of meaning in the world by 
asserting one while denying the other I am guilty of bad faith. I am exposed to 
the other by my physical presence before him, and am aware of this exposure, 
indeed I am wholly responsible for how the other perceives me - I possess as 
part of what I am the identity given me by the other, and to deny this is to deny 
that I am ambiguous, that I am neither purely an object in the world nor purely 
subjectivity. 
The substance of my past is the primary fact of an objective history, yet 
it is nonetheless inaccessible to the individual as such - it is revealed only 
through one's encounter with another. My intentions are revealed only through 
the act itself, and the act can be revealed only through the objective reality it 
attains in the situation, and this objective reality which helps to constitute the 
substance of my past is revealed to me only by the objectivity conferred upon 
me by others. From my own perspective I am only subjective. The objective 
side of my existence is revealed to me only by the other (the "Peeping Tom" 
revealed to me as myself by another's footsteps as I peek through a key hole). 
This objective side is hidden from me without the other, yet it is part of me 
because of my own ambiguous identity. My action implicates others, for it is 
not enough that I will freedom - I must act for freedom. But this action exposes 
me to the demands of the situation and to the demands of others. Therefore, I 
am forced to give meaning and value to the situation through my action, and I 
ma forced to do it for all humanity. 
The approach of consciousness to authenticity would itself be 
inauthentic if it ignores that consciousness exists only in situation. The 
situation cannot be abandoned, but rather must be penetrated to its deepest 
recesses by freedom. Thus, choosing my freedom requires choosing free 
relationships with others. My own freedom needs the freedom of the other in 
order not to deny itself. I must recognize myself, as a free being, as essential to 
the other's attempt at authentic self knowledge. The other must not be desired, 
neither as a freedom to be possessed nor as a freedom to be negated. Rather, the 
other must appear before me, in an authentic recognition of my own ambiguity 
and of the other's role in revealing myself to myself as well as the others own 
ambiguity as something I must achieve a consonance with. I must authentically 
realize the coincidence of ambiguity between myself and the other. To the other 
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I appear as an object, as an instrument to fulfill the others ends. Only when I 
may discover in this relationship the other's freedom as neither denying my 
freedom nor limiting it, but in fact as instrumental to its realization, can I be 
authentic. As I perform my own goal oriented activity, revealed as an object 
before the other, I am acted upon by the other (as I act upon him), both of us 
engaged in goal oriented activity. If in the process of accomplishing these 
activities we recognize that each of our own ends entailed in their realization the 
free choice of the activity of the other to be realized, each person's freedom was 
a free movement towards achieving the freely chosen end of the other, we 
achieve an active, real authenticity. The only possible crossroads for such an 
occurrence is freedom itself, the sole efficient cause for every value and end. 
Just as it would be pointless to engage in an argument, or to write a book, etc.• 
without intending or assuming the freedom of other people. my freedom must 
intend the freedom of the other, else, to the extent that I am a being-for-others. 
my "intention" will fail to be realized through my actions! Further, to the extent 
that I require others to pursue their freedom, I must will them the opportUnity to 
do so - I must emancipate others! Freedom, to be conceived authentically - with 
a view to our nature as ambiguous beings - cannot be conceived of either as an 
object that is all at once determined for everyone, nor a personal, inviolate 
project of each - it is neil.her a common transcendent truth nor an individual role. 
We cannot will freedom without grasping, on an intcrhumun level, the 
ambiguous existence of each other. We must make ourselves free, make 
ourselves human, both [or ourselves and in conjunction with other people. 
Sartre exemplifies this by pointing out the similarity between an aesthetic 
imperative and an ethical imperative. He suggests that an artist can create 
meaningful art only by recognizing of or positing the freedom of the viewer of 
his or her art, else his or her projcct would involve little more than a 
meaningless collection of stuff. Similarly, the viewer must recognize in an a 
priori manner the freedom of the artist when he or she examines the work of art. 
The act of creating an art work is an act which asserts a priori the freedom of 
both the artist and viewer by both parties if the art work is to be a true or 
meaningfull (authentic) art work. Just as in a moral imperative, a value is 
recognized: freedom is asserted as a value. is recognized and appealed 1.0, for if 
the ability to choose were not asserted and and recognized by both parties, why 
would either engage in the activity? 
The conclusion we can draw from this is that an existential imperative 
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is possible. It is 1X)ssible exactly to the extent that we can engage in activities 
which posit humanity's ambiguous existence on an interhuman level. As we 
have seen before, authenticity is not possible if I am play-acting, and further it is 
not 1X)ssible if I imagine that I do not, nonetheless, act in a situation with the 
result of creating a substantive past, a being-for-others. I cannot, therefore, 
imagine freedom to subsist on its own with a transcendent value - it is to be 
valued exactly because to do so is to act in accordance with the nature ontology 
defines for me. I am an ambiguous being, without appeal, and hence 
condemned to complete responsibility. I am, in other words, free, and to live my 
life authentically, to avoid denying what is necessarily true, I must realize my 
freedom, that is, act in a concrete manner in recognition of myself as freedom. 
Or, expressed another way, I must value my freedom. 
Let us turn, now, to a real world example to illustrate how it is possible 
to act authentically. Imagine that I am confronted by a singular elderly 
gentleman by the name of Dostoevski. After approaching me mumbling 
something about how if God is dead everything is permitted, he tells me that he 
wishes, as a free for-itself, to become my slave. I realize that I must refuse this 
request, and endeavor to explain myself to Mr. Dostoevski. 
The first thing we must consider, I suggest, is that freedom exists only 
as a negative reality until we determine it as our own freedom, making it a 
positive value. Given what I know about the ontological structure of the 
individual. I must will freedom for others as well as myself, else I am acting 
inauthentically, adopting freedom as my goal merely as it is urged upon me by 
my role as an "authentic person". Dostoevski, peering over his spectacles, 
suggests that, if it is his choices which define value, without which there could 
be no value at all, then whatever he decides must necessarily be right since it is 
his choices which define what is right. In retort, I suggest to Dostoevski that if I 
were to allow him to be my slave, it would deny my own authenticity, for not 
only is freedom not just an object with a transcendent value for all, it is also not 
a personal role I can play isolated from all others. By enslaving him, I would be 
denying my own ambiguous nature. The authentic life I seck is possible only if 
my intention to value my own freedom is revealed not just in the meanings I 
initiate in the world, but in the embodied I revealed to me by the other. In other 
words, I must be authentic with regard to both dimensions of my existence, both 
as a being-for-myself and as a being-for-others. I must act in such a way that, 
just like the artist and art connoisseur, my own actions presuppose the freedom 
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of not only me but of the other as well. In other words, I must grasp freedom on 
an interhuman level if! an to avoid being regulated to either positing freedom as 
an ideal, objectively valuable in itself, or as a mere role which I play. serving as 
a flight from my responsibility instead of a conscious recognition of it. 
To return, then, to our initial discussion, it is possible to have an 
imperative ethic in SaItre's ontological system. The key to this imperative is our 
being-for-others. We are an ambiguous being, and that ambiguity is continually 
revealed to us by others. If we recognize the subjective existence of others, we 
must at the same time recognize that freedom, while not a transcendent value for 
all, is also, nonetheless, not merely an isolated role to be realized by the 
individual on his or her own. Freedom, if we are to live our lives authentically, 
must be apprehended and valued on an interhuman level, and this requires the 
recognition of responsibility for our choices on an interhuman level as well. 
